“Securing reliable supplies of critical raw materials is a strategic priority for Europe’s resilience and competitiveness as it is essential for the modernisation of our economy […]. With this approach, we contribute to prosperity and stability in both Europe and our partner countries, strengthening economic security and diversifying supply chains.”
These are the words of Jozef Síkela, EU Commissioner for International Partnerships, that accompanied the announcement from 4th June 2025 about the selection of strategic projects on raw materials that are outside of the EU. It was hailed as a key step towards the material security of the EU. Yet the list of the selected 13 strategic projects in the third countries includes a number of controversial mining plans – just as the list of 47 strategic projects within the EU adopted a few months earlier does. That list includes planned lithium mines in Cínovec, Czech Republic or Barroso, Portugal, among others.
Among the most controversial projects is the plan to mine lithium in the Jadar Valley in Serbia. Led by Rio Tinto, a multinational mining corporation, the construction of the mine was set to commence in January 2022 and to become Europe’s biggest lithium mine. But the project attracted widespread resistance, resulting in one of the largest protest movements in modern Serbian history, and delaying the plans for years.
How does the prosperity and stability promised by Síkela translate on the ground in Serbia? For the local community in the Jadar Valley, the lithium mining project is one of the main ways through which the regime of President Aleksandar Vučić continues to enjoy the backing of the EU leaders. “Europe took off its gloves […], showing that it only looks after its interest and profit,” commented at the time the decision Zlatko Kokanović from the local organisation Ne Damo Jadar (We Don’t Give Jadar).
The strategic projects are being designated under the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), which entered into force last year. It became a key piece of legislation which aims to establish the EU’s control over the supply chain of the so-called critical raw materials (CRMs) such as lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite, Rare Earth Elements (REEs) and many others. These materials are now at the centre of geopolitical and geoeconomic concerns, with China dominating their processing as well as the related technologies, while the demand is expected to rise dramatically. The CRMA promotes mining projects within the EU as well as in partner countries. Yet despite the ongoing pressure to open up the mine in Serbia, the resistance of the local communities has continued.
Mining in a green field
The Jadar Project is considered to be one of the most significant plans to mine lithium on the European continent. In a response to questions, Rio Tinto estimates that at full production capacity, “Jadar is expected to produce approximately 58,000 tonnes of lithium carbonate, 286,000 tonnes of boric acid, and 255,000 tonnes of sodium sulfate annually. Over its anticipated 40-year mine life, this would amount to 2.3 million tonnes of lithium carbonate.” This would make it one of the largest lithium greenfield mines in the world.
The representatives of the EU Commission noted in their response that Jadar’s expected production of lithium carbonate “would represent around 18-26 % of forecasted EU demand.”
Still, the majority of the Serbian population opposes the construction of the mine. Among the main reasons are the concerns for the environment, the impact on the livelihoods of people living in the Jadar Valley, many of whom are farmers and agricultural workers, Rio Tinto’s history of problematic projects and conflicts with local communities, and a strong sense of injustice that the pollution from mining is to be externalised to Serbia while the EU and international investors are to reap the benefits.
Between November 2021 and January 2022, tens of thousands of people were blocking highways, roads and bridges across dozens of locations in Serbia as well as internationally, with solidarity protests taking place in front of Serbian embassies across the world.
The government was ultimately forced to cancel the mining project in January 2022, as the elections of April 2022 loomed ahead. Yet the protests have continued despite the cancellation, as have the signing of petitions and citizen initiatives against lithium mining.
Despite the ongoing resistance, the government nullified the cancellation and the Jadar Project was proclaimed to be strategic by the EU. Social and environmental concerns prevail despite Rio Tinto’s insistence that the project would be “developed in full compliance with Serbian and EU regulations, including the highest environmental standards,” as they write in their response.
The local community was not able to participate in the decision-making process, and it was not consulted on the decision. “Local communities are systematically disadvantaged in this fast track,” according to Robin Roels, the coordinator of the EU Raw Materials Coalition, which brings together civil society organisations on the issue.
“[The] pressure to deliver raw materials quickly is already skewing decisions away from rigorous environmental assessment and meaningful community consent, encouraging social engineering, sidelining independent expertise, and normalising risky practices,” notes Roels. Such fast-tracking was most visible last year in Belgrade with the rushed signing of the strategic partnership between the EU and Serbia.
A Belgrade Summit on fast-tracking
It was almost two and a half years since the cancellation of the Jadar Project when, in June 2024, the President Aleksandar Vučić gave an interview for the Financial Times, saying that Serbia is set to give “green light” to the planned lithium mine. Vučić cited “new guarantees” from Rio Tinto as well as the EU that the environmental concerns will be addressed. Within days, the EU’s support for the project became official. In July 2024, the Serbian Constitutional Court declared the government decree from January 2022, which cancelled the spatial plan for the Jadar Project, to be unlawful. Following that, the Serbian government issued a new decree on 16th July 2024, which reinstated the project.
Only two days later, on 18th July 2024, a delegation of EU representatives arrived in Belgrade to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which established the Strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and EVs between the EU and Serbia. While the strategic partnerships are non-binding agreements, they send a strong political signal of close cooperation. Apart from Maroš Šefčovič, who was at the time the European Commission Executive Vice-President for European Green Deal, the signing was also attended by then-Chancellor of Germany Olaf Scholz and the Italian and US ambassadors to Serbia, among others.
Additionally, the Letter of Intent on the development of the e-mobility value chain was signed by the Serbian Minister of Economy, the President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), as well as the CEOs of Mercedes-Benz and Rio Tinto. The corporate interests thus converged with those of Serbian political elites and of the EU representatives, making it evident that multinational corporations are just as interested in mining lithium in Serbia as the politicians.
This was not the first time that the EU pushed for a controversial agreement while disregarding the local concerns. In 2023, it signed strategic partnerships with Zambia and DR Congo despite well-documented human rights abuses, particularly related to the mining of cobalt and copper. The following year, it also signed a strategic partnership with Rwanda, regardless of the fact that the Rwanda-backed M23 armed group has been accused of committing war crimes linked to resources in the eastern part of DR Congo.
In Serbia, despite the rushed reinstatement of the Jadar Project and the signing of the strategic partnership in the middle of the summer, protests erupted in cities and towns across the country. Spontaneous gatherings took place, including in Arandjelovac, Barajevo, Bogatić, Kraljevo, Ljig, Požega, Šabac, Valjevo and many others. While these are smaller cities with fewer than 100,000 inhabitants, and often located hundreds of kilometres from the Jadar Valley, the research group Arhiv javnih skupovina (Archive of Public Gatherings) highlighted how these protests against lithium could be considered some of the biggest in the history of the country if adjusted per capita. That makes lithium possibly a bigger motivation to protest than the election fraud, violence, or the question of Kosovo, according to the Archive.
In September 2024, following the summer of protests against lithium mining, the opposition parties proposed a draft law to ban the exploration and exploitation of lithium and borates, which 84 MPs voted for. While the proposal was rejected within the unfree system of Serbian governance, it was yet another signal of how central the question of the Jadar Project has become.
Meanwhile, the international support for lithium mining has continued. In December 2024, five months after the memorandum signing, Scholz invited Vučić to Saxony for a high-level visit – specifically to Freiberg, the headquarters of the Saxon Mining Authority, where the Zinnwald Lithium project was presented as an example of future sustainable mining. “The demand for this raw material will be enormous, and that is why it is important to realize as many projects as possible in Europe,” said the Chancellor at the time. The Zinnwald project is part of the deposit, which stretches across the border between Germany and the Czech Republic, and the plans to mine lithium have faced opposition from both communities. Yet while Zinnwald in Germany was not declared strategic, Cínovec on the Czech side was among the 47 strategic projects within the EU.
At the same time, the political oppression of those opposing the mining project in Serbia has only escalated. Activists and protestors have faced death threats, physical violence, detention and imprisonment, as well as home raids and having their phones and laptops searched. In December 2024, an investigation by Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) and Amnesty International proved that the Serbian domestic security agency BIA has been using Israeli technology to illegally unlock activists’ and journalists’ phones, extract data and install spyware. Only months later, in June 2025, the Jadar Project received the status of a critical project under the CRMA.
Strategic project for whom
Rio Tinto welcomed the decision to designate the Jadar Project as strategic, “confirming its criticality to Serbia and Europe’s security of supply of critical raw materials essential for the green transition.”
According to the Commission, the selection process involves an assessment by independent experts to verify compliance with the requirements of the Critical Raw Materials Act, particularly in terms of environmental, social, and governance principles (ESG), as well as technical viability. “The projects need to be mutually beneficial to the EU and the third country,” the representatives of the Commission noted in their response.
Responding to the questions for this article, Rio Tinto described the decision as “a signal […] to continue developing Jadar with full transparency, environmental responsibility, and in compliance with both Serbian and EU regulations.” For the critiques of the project, such a signal further undermines the pro-democratic efforts in Serbia, as the Serbian regime has responded with increasing violence and targeting of those who are opposing the mining project.
“We are seeing a vast amount of police brutality and violence against those people which are protesting against the mine, including myself, so all of this directly challenges the ESG approach taken up by the Critical Raw Materials Board. Had one followed that approach correctly, it would have inevitably led to the project losing the status of strategic project,” according to Aleksandar Matković, an economist at the University of Belgrade and a campaigner against the project. Matković himself received around 30 death threats last year following the publication of his article in which he questioned the economic benefits of the Jadar Project.
The Critical Raw Materials Board, the body of the European Commission that reviewed these projects, received several open letters from Serbian academics and activists, in the coordination of which Matković was involved. “We gathered around 100,000 signatories in three days’ time” in a petition that was given to the Delegation of the European Union in Belgrade,” he adds.
Similarly, the National Convention on the European Union in Serbia warned in an open letter addressed to Ursula von der Leyen and other high representatives of the EU Commission that recognising the Jadar Project as strategic would “further undermine citizens’ confidence in the benefits of European integration.”
“So you have all of these voices, scientific institutions, bodies, faculties, citizens, all raising concerns over the mine, and the European Commission ignoring all of that,” Matković comments.
Following the working dinner with the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and the President of the European Council, António Costa, in March this year, the Serbian President Vučić announced that Jadar will be proclaimed as strategic within “seven or eight days.” It ended up being several more months instead.
“It is evident that the President went there to offer the Project, despite the ongoing situation and instability in the country […] in exchange for remaining in power,” commented at the time Zlatko Kokanović on the President’s visit.
The European Commission did not provide an answer to the question of whether representatives of Rio Tinto or Serbian institutions were involved in lobbying for the project to be declared as strategic. Neither did it comment on the current political situation in Serbia and the growing unrest.
Democracy or secrecy
In a written response, Rio Tinto highlights that “[a]s a global company, [it] supports greater transparency, strong institutions, and constructive dialogue in every country where we operate. We also support civil society and believe in the value of community participation.”
It is now the EU Commission itself that has faced criticism over a lack of transparency and dialogue. In July this year, four green MEPs accused the Commission of secrecy and failing to meaningfully involve the public in the decision-making process. Access to information was denied to the MEPs, and the responses from the Commission were described as generic and evasive.
“Despite several requests by MEPs and NGOs we have not been given access or provided information about the assessments of selected or upcoming projects. We believe that transparency in these matters is not only a legal obligation, but an integral part of institutional accountability,” the MEPs told Euronews in July this year. Three NGOs filed a complaint against the Commission’s decision to declare the lithium project in Portugal as strategic.
Critical raw materials have for years been understood as central to the green transition, with lithium becoming synonymous with batteries and electric vehicles. The dominant understanding of the green transition, which is based on continuous economic growth and ever-growing material consumption, would require an unprecedented rise in mining to meet the demand. Yet what is becoming increasingly evident is the centrality of the CRMs also in the defence industry.
The secrecy is then often connected to military interests as “the broader push toward militarisation now creates more opportunities to invoke overriding public interest,” highlights Robin Roels. “That use of defence and military grounds to limit transparency turns a policy framed as enhancing resilience into a partially secret supply race, making it far harder to hold actors to account,” he adds.
The rush for the CRMs is thus undermining some of the very values on which the EU was built. The past ten months in Serbia have seen the largest protest movement in history shake the regime of Aleksandar Vučić, emerging in response to the collapse of a concrete canopy of a newly renovated train station in Novi Sad, which killed 16 people. The movement has galvanised around the lack of transparency of large infrastructural projects and corruption, drawing many parallels with mining projects in Serbia.
Yet the EU’s response to the largest pro-democratic movement the continent has seen in decades, and to what has been described by some as the biggest student movement since 1968, has remained tepid, to say the least.
“Recognising Jadar as a strategic project while tens of thousands of people in Serbia have been protesting, and while serious procedural and governance questions remain unanswered, sends the wrong signal,” notes Roels.
A recent survey from spring 2025 showed that only 33% of Serbian citizens “would vote in favour of Serbia’s membership of the EU if a referendum was held” – the lowest in the region. Yet the pressure from the side of the EU to open up the mine has continued, paying little attention to the public opinion of the EU, which is only deteriorating.
Crucially, it is the very branch on which the EU is sitting that is being sawn off. “[F]or the EU the problem is both practical and reputational. If the Commission treats enlargement partners as mere resource providers, then it undermines the principles the Union claims to promote. The message to citizens in Serbia and to communities across the region is clear: policy on critical raw materials can be pursued separately from transparency, human rights, and democratic accountability. That undermines trust in EU institutions and hands critics a simple story: raw material security equals extraction at any cost,” added Roels.
Matković went further in his critique from April this year, around the time when Vučić first proclaimed that the project would be designated as strategic. “My impression of all of this is that a destiny of a one country is being decided in an incredibly amateur manner. Maybe we don’t even understand to what extent the people who decide about us, who would like to decide about us, actually have no idea what they’re doing,” he commented on the decision-making process. “Not in a sense that they are not doing this consciously, but in a sense that they do not understand the consequences,” he adds during our interview.
Meanwhile, the protests are showing no signs of stopping or slowing down. What is at stake is the reputation of the EU, which, both within its borders and outside of them, is turning to increasingly opaque and undemocratic practices, undermining its own proclaimed values. Unless it changes course, the strategic projects will turn out to be one of the EU’s greatest strategic mistakes.
The production of this investigation was supported by a grant from the Investigative Journalism for Europe (IJ4EU) fund.
